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CHINA IN THE EYES OF THE FRENCH INTELLECTUALS 
To be invited to give this lecture in memory of George Ernest Morrison, 
that remarkable Australian, is not only a pleasure and an honour; it 
provides a very appropriate occasion to review the unique position 
China has held for more than three centuries in the eyes of French 
intellectuals. Morrison, himself quite fluent in French and well versed in 
French literature, was very familiar with some distinguished members of 
the French intelligentsia who visited China during those 'Morrison 
years', such as Loti, Segalen and Claude!. He also knew well how 
prestigious China had been in the eyes of French intellectuals of an 
earlier period, namely French Jesuits and French Phi/osophes of the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth century. Their writings occupy a distinctive 
position on the shelves of Morrison's own library, once in Peking and 
later transferred to Japan. These early French books with their old-
fashioned print and leather binding indicated, and Morrison was fully 
aware of it, that a major intellectual encounter had taken place between 
France and China. For the Philosophes, for Voltaire, Diderot and other 
contributors to the Great Encyc/opedia, China was a powerful war 
machine which they directed against the backwardness, the tyranny, the 
impotence of the Versailles monarchy. As seen in the very title of a 
well-known French Ph.D. dissertation, China played an essential role in 
the formation and growth of the esprit philosophique in eighteenth 
century France.I 
China, in the view of these philosophes, was an empire ruled by an 
intellectual elite, namely the Confucian literati. In our subsequent 
Western political culture, our universities being no exception, 
'mandarin' has become a symbol of bureaucratic rigidity, almost a dirty 
word. But such was not the case in the eighteenth century. Voltaire 
praised very highly the Confucian degree holders he called Ta/apoints -
a strange word which has since vanished entirely. China was seen as 
Virgile Pinot, La Chine et la formation de /'esprit phi/osophique en 
France, 1640-1740 (Paris, 1932). 
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being ruled by men of wisdom, and this was an obvious contrast to the 
practices of the French monarchy and its corrupt, incompetent, 
uneducated officials. China was supposed to be at least as advanced as 
France, on the way towards Enlightenment, towards l'Age des Lumieres. 
These peoples [said Diderot], gifted with a 'consentiment 
unanime', are superior to all other Asiatics in antiquity, 
intellect, art, wisdom, policy, and in their taste for 
philosophy; nay, in the judgment of certain authors, they 
dispute the palm in these matters with the most enlightened 
peoples of Europe.2 
Pierre Poivre, one of the very few Philosophes who actually visited the 
Far East, was even more lyrical in his praise of China: 
China offers an enchanting picture of what the whole world 
might become, if the laws of that empire were to become the 
laws of all nations. Go to Peking! Gaze upon the mightiest of 
mortals; he is the true and perfect image of Heaven.3 
The Philosophes also praised China, and accordingly condemned the 
French ancien regime, on a more specific issue which they considered of 
cardinal importance, namely free trade and free circulation for wheat and 
other cereals throughout France. The philosopher Quesnay4 and other 
leaders of the Physiocratique School, for whom agriculture was the 
foundation of prosperity, contrasted repeatedly the free movement of 
rice in China, and the tedious bureaucratic formalities imposed then in 
2 From Diderot's Encyclopedie. English translation from A. 
Reichwein, China and Europe, Intellectual and Artistic Contacts in 
the Eighteenth Century (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 
London, 1925), p.92. Reichwein offers the best comprehensive 
treatment of China at the Age of Enlightenment, together with L. 
Maverick (see note 10). 
3 Pierre Poivre, Voyages d' un P hilosophe (English translation by 
Reichwein, loc. cit.) 
4 Fran~ois Quesnay, Le Despotisme de la Chine (Paris, 1767). His 
friends had dubbed him 'the Confucius of Europe'. 
3 
France on the trade in wheat, fonnalities they held responsible for the 
high prices of food and the frequent famines in the French countryside. 
More generally, they saw China as a model government, interfering 
only lightly with society at large - in contrast to the over-intrusive 
Service du Roi. They took at face value the traditional Confucian precept 
of jimi - governing light-handedly - a precept not quite in confonnity 
with the actual practice of the Confucian bureaucracy at that time. But 
this did not matter so much, for China was used, to quote from a 
previous Morrison Lecture devoted to the China-watcher tradition, 'as a 
proxy to fight what was in essence a local European and more 
specifically a French battle' .s 
Yes, China was a genuine intellectual battlefield. Ironically 
enough, the China which proved to be such a powerful war-machine 
against the Catholic monarchy had been introduced into the French 
intellectual scene by the Jesuits, who had established themselves in 
Peking as technical advisers to the last Ming and the early Manchu 
emperors. The Jesuits' basic strategy was to establish the compatibility 
of a conversion to Christianity with the continuation of the Confucian 
ceremonies of respect to the Emperor and to family ancestors. They had 
to defend this strategy against other influential church lobbies in Rome, 
especially the Dominicans. The Jesuits were defeated, eventually, but 
they had produced in the course of this epoch-making controversy - La 
Querelle des Ceremonies Chinoises - an enonnous wealth of material 
highly favourable to Chinese culture and society, among which the 
standard collections of Father Lecomte6 and Father Du Halde7 are best 
known. After these Jesuits' memoirs had lost their polemical value 
5 Lo Hui-min, The Tradition and Prototype of the China-watcher, 
1976 G.E. Morrison lecture (Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1978), p. 9. 
6 Louis Lecomte, Nouveaux memoires sur l' etat present de la Chine 
(Paris, 1969) 
7 Du Halde, Description geographique, historique, chronologique. 
politique et physique de l' Empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie 
Chinoise (Paris, 1735). 
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within the Church, they found a new lease of life with the Philosophes, 
who turned them against the whole ancien regime. 
China's position in this Age of Enlightenment is well-known. 
Rather than chart it in greater detail, I should like to emphasise that for 
the French Philosophe, China was a perfectly abstract entity, an 
ideological construct, an intellectual artefact. Needless to say, almost 
none of them had ever visited China or had contemplated doing so. The 
Philosophes, and the Jesuits before them, knew nothing of the deeply 
rooted dissatisfaction of the Chinese people with foreign Manchu rule, 
of the rampant peasant unrest, the bureaucratic control of the economy, 
the atmosphere of intellectual rigidity, or the repression against 
dissidents. In their eyes, China was not so much idealised, but rather 
completely reprocessed, reconstructed so as to fit into French intellectual 
and political controversies. 
Yes, China was an abstraction, and this was not considered a 
handicap. For China as reconstructed by the Philosophes was an 
essential prerequisite for the achievement of a genuine philosophical 
universality, for a universal and world-wide approach to human nature 
and human society. China enabled these Phi/osophes to break away from 
a Eurocentric view of world history, founded only on Greek and Roman 
cultures and on earlier Hebrew traditions. To include China in their 
views on modem progress, to appeal to China as much as to Greece and 
Rome, was a major intellectual and philosophical advance towards 
universality. Voltaire was most concerned with this generalising 
approach to world history. His famous essay, 'The Century of Louis the 
Fourteenth', concludes - and this was a logical step - not with an 
assessment of the state of French affairs, but with a chapter which had 
apparently nothing to do with France, a chapter entirely devoted to the 
Manchu Emperor Kangxi, whose reign almost exactly corresponds in 
China to the equally long years of Louis XIV in France. Long before 
UNESCO, Voltaire compiled under the misleading title Essai sur les 
Moeurs - an essay on human manners and ways - a long and detailed 
comparative history of the world as it was known to him, making a point 
of keeping a proper balance between the chapters dealing with Europe, 
the Arab civilisations, India and of course China. 
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China had enabled the French Philosophe to approach the problems 
of mankind at the highest possible level, and in most general terms. 
China had indeed been the occasion of a major intellectual advance, but 
probably at the expense of China itself. One should wonder whether the 
Westerner ever gave up this attitude, namely dealing with China as an 
abstraction, almost as Utopia. The French eighteenth century 
intellectuals may well have a responsibility for this major incapacity of 
ours, even today, to face China as a more complex and more concrete 
reality, not an abstract construction. 
For French intellectuals, China was indeed a philosophical 
abstraction. But it was also a cultural fashion, almost a cultural gadget 
Chinoiseries were very popular, through tapestries, lacquers and silks, 
porcelains and ceramics.s Pagodas were built in many aristocratic 
gardens and parks. China was a popular theme for aquatint engravings. 
The success of the rococo style in architecture and decoration had a 
distinct Chinese flavour, the shady and gracefully vanishing colours and 
shapes of Watteau's landscapes displayed a remote but definite Chinese 
influence. China was everywhere, even on the stage with a play by 
Voltaire, L'Orphe/in de la Chine. The monarchy itself had engaged in 
the Chinese fashions. The ageing Louis XIV celebrated the first New 
Year of the eighteenth century with refined, if fake, Chinese-style 
festivities. Madame de Pompadour, Louis XV's mistress and a declared 
supporter of Voltaire and Diderot, was keen to give the Chinese touch to 
her banquets, feasts and dances a la chinoise. This Chinese affectation is 
a well-known chapter of our eighteenth-century cultural history, and it is 
also a political paradox. For those aristocrats and nobility who had been 
indulging in Chinese art and Chinese festivities were to meet their fate in 
1789 and 1793. They were to be crushed by a major revolution to which 
China had contributed through the intellectual battles waged by the 
8 Hugh Honour, Chinoiseries, the Vision of Cathay (John Murray, 
London, 1961). 
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Philosophes against the monarchy. And this was no longer a dinner 
party a la chinoise.9 
A major intellectual and cultural encounter had definitely taken 
place between China and France. But was it France alone? The addiction 
to chinoiseries was equally popular with the English nobility and gentry. 
German Philosophes were as keen as their fellow Frenchmen to achieve 
genuine universality through China. Such was the message of Leibniz's 
'Chinese latest news' (Novissima Sinica), an essay advocating the 
dispatch to Europe of Chinese Confucian missionaries so as to balance 
the impact of Christian missionaries to China. Yes, China was then 
valued as a model for the whole of Europe, to quote the title of a 
suggestive essay by Louis Maverick.10 
Nevertheless, there is something definitely French in the 
magnitude, in the style, in the rhetoric of France's encounter with China. 
France was more deeply committed to China than any other European 
country in the eighteenth century, and this reflects the specifically acute 
crisis of French society and the French political regime at that time: a 
crisis in which French intellectuals were most actively involved. The 
attraction of China, eccentric and artificial as it was, was part of the 
French ideological upheaval which contributed so decisively to the 
French Revolution. 
The concern for China was also very French in its claim to achieve 
theoretical universalism, to think and to reason for the whole of 
humankind in the grand Cartesian tradition. From fashionable 
chinoiseries to high-level intellectual achievements, such as those of 
Voltaire, Diderot and Goumay, the whole thing was conducted with a 
9 In 1951, at the Lycee de Chartres where I was teaching history, the 
bicentenary of Diderot's Encyclopedia was celebrated at the 
initiative of left-wing teachers who were keen to stress the 
connection between the Encyclopedia and French Revolutionary 
traditions. I gave a public lecture: 'China and the Encylopedists ', 
of which the present Morrison lecture might be considered the 
direct descendant 
10 Lewis A. Maverick, China, a Model for Europe (Paul Anderson 
Company, San Antonio, Texas, 1946). 
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typical French sense of sensationalism; it was a well-staged intellectual 
play lasting for almost a century, with the whole cultural elite in the cast. 
Other peoples simply act; the French always like to perform, and to find 
a public for it. 
One must always take into account this French addiction to 
performing and making an impact on their public, whether dealing with 
the intellectual fireworks in honour of China in the eighteenth century, 
or on the occasion of more recent and far less pleasant pyrotechnics, 
somewhere in Polynesia ... 
So the Philosophes' encounter with China had, at its own level, 
contributed to the fall of the French monarchy. And for more than a 
century, French intellectuals were to be concerned with a completely 
different range of issues: political revolutions and counter-revolutions, 
France's position in Europe, industrial development and its social fall-
out, freedom of speech and of thought, as well as colonial expansion. 
China had very little to do with these French-centred debates of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. It had by then become a target 
for Western imperialism including France, and its cultural prestige was 
accordingly declining. China only mattered for a few isolated if not 
eccentric French intellectuals. China in this period was a very marginal 
feature in French intellectual life. 
Some of these marginal Sinophiles of the nineteenth century were 
belated admirers of an ideal and abstract China in the grand 
philosophical tradition. In a little-known novel by Balutc, L'Interdiction 
- a legal measure depriving a spendthrift of control over his estate - a 
Marquis d'Espard spends all his fortune on reprinting old Jesuit memoirs 
on China. He is a devoted right-wing monarchist; he admires the 
Chinese imperial monarchy for allegedly maintaining a social order the 
French kings had been unable to maintain. His wife, a typical Balzacian 
marquise, has a legal interdiction passed on him. 
The Marquis d'Espard is a lonely figure in Balutc's little world -
the Human Comedy - and equally solitary was the young Baudelaire, 
who was at college when Balzac was flourishing. In one of his strongest 
poems, Le Voyage (or 'the trip', also with the colloquial connotations of 
this word), his concern for China is expressed through brief but 
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extremely challenging verses - a concern he must have developed in his 
college years: 
De meme qu'autrefois nous partions pour la Chine 
Les yeux fixes au large et les cheveux au vent 
Nous nous embarquerons pour la Mer des Tenebres 
Avec le coeur joyeux d'unjeune passager.11 
Just as in the old days we would leave for China 
Our eyes looking out to sea and our hair streaming in the wind 
We shall sail henceforward for the Sea of Darkness 
Cheerful and lighthearted as a young traveller. 
This is a major reversal, from the China 'trip' into the Sea of Darkness. 
This is a remarkable and prophetic insight on the part of Baudelaire, a 
poetic formulation which is most relevant to our present-day intellectual 
crisis. We shall refer to it again a little later. 
As the nineteenth century went on, as French political involvement 
in China and Vietnam became more effective, it was not unusual for 
French intellectuals to visit China and to emphathise with her - but 
always as isolated individuals. Such a one was Father Huc,12 a Catholic 
missionary whose minority voice, uncertain as it was, insisted on the 
specific values of Chinese culture and habits. China was a source of 
inspiration for diplomats posted there, such as Eugene Simon, whose 
book La Cite chinoise is a minor classic13 - modelled on Fustel de 
Coulanges's standard essay La Cite grecque, - and later Paul Claudel, a 
young consul in Tianjin, expressing his emotions in Connaissance de 
l' Est, a collection of poems in the Symbolist manner.14 French visitors 
11 From Les F/eurs du Mai (my translation). 
12 Evariste Regis Hue, L' Empire chinois (Paris, 1854). For a more 
severe evaluation of Hue, see Simon Leys, The Burning Forest 
(New York, 1986), pp. 47-94 ('Peregrinations and perplexities of 
Pere Hue'). 
13 Eugene Simon, La Cite chinoise (Paris, 1885). 
14 Paul Claudel, Connaissance de l' Est (Mercure de France, Paris, 
1908). 
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to China included naval officers such as Pierre Loti, who had witnessed 
approvingly another sack of Peking by Western Allied forces after the 
Boxer Rebellion, or Victor Segalen, poet and archaeologist. Later still, 
intellectuals turned into revolutionaries, such as the young Andre 
Malraux who was involved in the 1926-27 Communist revolution in 
Canton, and who drew on this experience for his two major novels, Les 
Conquerants and La Condition humaine. Hue, Simon, Claude!, Segalen, 
Loti and Malraux had indeed very little in common except that they 
were somehow marginal figures on the French intellectual scene of their 
time. Even for those who were later to achieve international fame, such 
as Claudel and Malraux, China had not been much more than an 
aventure de jeunesse - as had been the case of young Rene Leys, the 
intriguing adventurer, the mythomaniac hero of Segalen's best novel, the 
secret lover of China's last Empress. 
Segalen's novel may allow me to say one more word on his 
unusual cultural itinerary, which began in Polynesia where he was 
searching for old Polynesian myths and also for Gauguin's manuscripts, 
and which ended up in China with Rene Leys and his cryptic poems 
Steles. China and the Pacific probably fascinated Segalen because of 
their mutual irreducibility. They utterly contrast one with the other, one 
in its historical as well as geographical compactness, the other in its 
marine immensity and its tiny, highly diversified societies. It is hardly 
surprising that so few Western intellectuals have combined an active 
interest in both. My own intellectual detours between Chinese studies 
and the problems of the Pacific have probably brought me closer to 
Segalen's rather unique position. 
All these lively but isolated figures have left us with highly 
valuable literary contributions. However they expressed little interest in 
China's historical fate and political plight.15 They were concerned with 
15 The novel by Jules Verne, Les Tribulations d'un Chinois en Chine 
(1879), is quite unique in its concern for the politics of nineteenth-
century China. The hero, Kin Fo, is tom between his fascination 
with modem technology and his loyalty to his teacher Wong, who 
is an ex-Taiping leader. It is to my knowledge the only appearance 
of the Taiping rebellion in French literature. 
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China's essence. China for them, or most of them, was a kind of cultural 
and aesthetic curiosity. And I am not sure that Malraux does not fall into 
this category, whatever the political setting of his novels. The powerful 
voice of Victor Hugo, combining artistic concern and political 
involvement and condemning from his Guernsey exile the sack of the 
old Summer Palace in Peking in 1860, has remained distinctly isolated: 
Somewhere in a dark comer of the world, there was a marvel 
of the world and this marvel was named the Summer 
Palace ... It was a kind of frightening unknown masterpiece of 
Asian civilisation on the horizon of European civilisation. 
All the treasures of our cathedrals would not match this 
formidable Museum of the East. 
Two bandits once entered the Summer Palace... One of the 
victors filled his pockets, whereas the other filled his treasure 
chests ... In the face of history one bandit will bear the name 
of France, the other the name of England ... I hope that some 
day, France once freed and cleansed will send back to China 
the booty she has plundered.16 
Incidentally, the Summer Palace of Peking, sacked and burned by 
French and British vandals, had been restored in the time of Emperor 
Qianlong (eighteenth century) by Jesuit architects and painters such as 
the famous Castiglione. The very contribution of European culture to 
China was smashed down by European militarism in China. 
That French intellectuals concerned with China not only were very 
few, but also showed little interest in the political China, is supported by 
the non-committed attitude of that strange Jesuit, palaeontologist and 
philosopher, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. His Chinese years in the 1920s 
and 1930s were most productive intellectually. He elaborated his partly 
mystical, partly anthropological views on man's fate and future. Yet, he 
was utterly indifferent to the complex developments of the Chinese 
16 V. Hugo, Lettre au Capitaine Butler, Hauteville House, 25 
November 1861 (my translation). 
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revolution at that time, epoch-making as they were. He was living in a 
China almost without Chinese - except fossils. 
Teilhard de Chardin was an intellectual explorer, almost an 
adventurer, and so was the energetic Pelliot, one of the founding fathers 
of modern French sinology. He had established his reputation with his 
expedition to the Dunhuang Buddhist caves in the Gobi Desert, had not 
hesitated to bribe and to steal, brought back to France a unique Chinese 
library and became a Professor at the College de France at the early age 
of27. 
French sinology then was still entirely oriented towards classical 
China. Just as British sinology was a by-product of missionary studies 
on China, French sinology was a distant replica of Latin and Greek 
studies in the Jesuit tradition. The teaching aids which the Jesuits had 
prepared for classical Chinese often used Latin. Classical Chinese 
studies did not have to pay attention to the China of that time, any more 
than Latin and Greek studies did to the Italy and Greece of modern 
times. And classical sinology remained quite marginal in French 
academic life, just as much as China-inspired novels and poetry in 
French literature. Yet, the nineteenth-century sinologists had laid the 
foundations for modern China in studies in the West. 
But this long episode of almost total neglect of China was to come 
to an end with the unexpected ascendancy of Communist China. French 
intellectuals were caught completely unprepared, all the more since there 
was strictly no equivalent in France to the sympathetic writings of Snow, 
Smedley and so many other reporters who had prepared at least some 
sections of British and American public opinion for the Communist 
takeover. The French intellectual scene was a blank page - a very 
Maoist feature - and this was a decisive contributing factor to what has 
since been described - and branded in some quarters with utter contempt 
- as the 'love affair' between Maoist China and French intellectuals. 
This love affair is a very complex story, and requires a much closer 
look. It had first of all to do with the rejection on the part of the French 
intellectuals of Soviet-styled communism, once so popular with them. 
China and Maoism provided ex-Communist Party members with an 
occasion to settle their accounts with Moscow. Chinese communism was 
also considered a valuable experiment in Marxist economic theory, and 
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noted economists, such as Charles Bettelheim17 always made this point 
For Jean-Paul Sartre, who was in the late 1960s at the peak of his 
cultural and political prestige, Peking was definitely different from 
Moscow. 
China also met a basic aspiration among French left-wing 
intellectuals, which I would describe as political exoticism, that is, the 
tendency to look for a political homeland and model of reference in 
distant, exotic countries. At times in Cuba, at one time in Algeria, in 
Vietnam, then in China; each provided a substitute for the ideal society 
France was unable to develop at home, especially after the failure of the 
May '68 movement-which had been so popular with most intellectuals, 
and not only with students. The radical young intellectuals of the May 
'68 generation, such as Andre Glucksmann and Bernard-Henri Levy, 
who were later to establish themselves as trendy 'new philosophers', 
were among the most devoted Maoists. 
But it would be just too easy to restrict the love affair between 
Maoism and French intellectuals to such radical groups. At least two 
completely different factors come into the picture, namely Gaullism and 
Italy. 
A hidden but deep correspondence had always existed between 
Gaullists and Maoists. Both emphasised the importance of historical 
roots and long-term perspectives, for France de toujours as well as for 
the Sons of the Han on their everlasting Yellow Earth. Both had refused 
to align their nuclear policies with the strategies of the superpowers. 
Andre Malraux's visit to China in the 1960s, both as a former activist in 
the 1926-27 revolution and as a prominent Gaullist intellectual, was a 
symbolic episode, much publicised in France. Had General de Gaulle 
not died suddenly in 1971, he most probably would have paid Mao 
Zedong the visit already arranged by his old companion Etienne 
Manach, then French Ambassador to Peking. It would have been an 
17 Charles Bettelheim, Cultural Revolution and Industrial 
Organisation in China: Changes in Management and the Division 
of Labor, trans. by Alfred Ehrenfeld (Monthly Review Press, New 
York, 1974). See also China Since Mao, by Neil G. Burton and 
Charles Bettelheim (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1978). 
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extraordinary performance, in both the grand French and Chinese 
traditions. 
Italy was also very influential. There has always been a special 
connection between Italy and China. Chinese intellectuals have always 
felt very much at home in Italy, and the active sympathy for Maoist 
China of such prominent Italian intellectuals as Malaparte, Alberto 
Moravia and Maria-Antonietta Macchiocchi certainly made an impact 
on Parisian literary circles. Altogether, many influential French 
intellectuals were in those years very keen on visiting China and -
however brief their visit - publicising their sympathy for China. Be they 
Claude Roy, Etiemble, Roland Barthes, Philippe Sollers, Julia KristevalS 
or many others, their individual approaches may have differed one from 
another, but they were all indulging in China as if their commitment to 
China was more important than China itself. They also affected a 
definitely revivalistic attitude, as if they were the new sinophiles in the 
grand eighteenth-century tradition. 
By and large, Maoist China was very chic in French cultural life of 
the 1950s and 1960s. The theatres were packed full at every Peking 
Opera visit, the books of Han Suyin sold very well, Chinese exhibitions 
of art at the Grand Palais were a must, the veteran film-director Joris 
Ivens, Dutch by birth but settled in France, embarked on a 12-hour film 
on Yu Gong and People's China's achievements, and the well-
established literary publishing series La P/eiade was wide open to 
classical Chinese literature, which benefited from the Maoist vogue. 
The Maoist mirage met nevertheless with reservations and 
condemnations from various quarters - from the conservative Catholic 
right-wing and also from .the pro-Moscow French Communist Party, 
which was hardly surprising, but also from two more specific groups, 
rather influential among intellectuals. The academic sinologists on one 
hand were very critical of the pi:o-Maoist fashion, with very few 
exceptions they were well aware of the simplistic naivety of the new 
18 Claude Roy, Cles pour la Chine (Paris, 1954); Etiemble, Le 
Nouveau singe-pelerin (Paris, 1957); Philippe Sollers, Tel quel (a 
literary magazine edited by Sollers), passim; Julia Kristeva, Des 
Chinoises (Paris, 19~4) 
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sinophiles. Yet, one should wonder whether their open hostility towards 
the fashionable intellectuals was not after all a kind of defensive reaction 
against what sinologists considered to be trespassing on their 
professional estate! On the other hand, pro-Maoist intellectuals were 
harassed pitilessly by a radical and very vociferous group, the young 
situationists, whose overall attack against established cultural values of 
every kind had been an important contribution to the May '68 
movement. Thus an unexpected anti-Maoist alliance was formed 
between respectable sinologists and sniping situationists, which was to 
make a lasting impact in France and in which the Canberra academic 
scene also became involved. 
Looking at this strange, erratic, very emotional love affair at a 
distance, some fifteen or twenty years later, how should we react -
including myself? The whole affair was certainly a strange combination 
of affectation and naivety, of misinformation and self-complacency, 
which deserves blame and regret and nothing else. We were definitely 
lacking intellectual rigour, caution and integrity. Not only did we satisfy 
ourselves with a rosy picture of China, which was conveyed to us by 
visitors on short-term and carefully controlled tours, but we made this 
rosy picture an essential ingredient of our social prestige, our publishing 
careers, our popularity with the media. We failed completely to assess 
properly our responsibility towards French public opinion and especially 
towards those for whom China understandably meant hope, 
determination, the ability to shape one's own future. I am not sure that 
self-criticism was something George Ernest Morrison was quite familiar 
with. But I am pleased that the present Morrison Lecture gives me a 
convenient occasion for expressing such regret. 
Yet I have no regrets whatsoever for the basic motivations which 
led so many French radical intellectuals to side with Maoism in the 
turbulent 1970s. Some of the trendy Maoists may have been concerned 
most of all with the image of China they were propagating for their own 
satisfaction and prestige. Yet others, as I can testify, had more sincere 
and far-reaching motivations. We took seriously the 'mass line', in 
contrast to politics set at the top. People's communes appealed all the 
more to us, since uncontrolled urban growth had become a cornerstone 
of the French Fifth Republic overall economic strategies. 'To rely on 
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one's own strength', zili gengsheng, made sense to us, against the 
prevailing trends towards cultural banalisation of French daily life on the 
American model. 'Bombard the headquarters' was a slogan well-
received among those who, after the failure of the May '68 movement, 
had experienced the backlash of the established political parties 
regaining their monopoly over French political life. We were certainly 
wrong in our simplified approach to the complex realities of Chinese 
politics and Chinese society. But looking at it from a distance, we were 
not necessarily wrong in advocating Maoist analyses and Maoist 
thinking so as to approach critically what we probably knew better than 
China, namely France itself. 
The major intellectual encounter between China and France in the 
eighteenth century belongs to the past; the solitary French sinophiles of 
the nineteenth cenrury have remained marginal in French literary 
history, and the Maoist love affair of the 1960s and early 1970s has 
ended pathetically, as most love affairs do. What next? One should 
perhaps consider, by way of conclusion, the relevance China may still 
have, in relation to the French intellectual crisis of the 1980s. 
To describe present-day France in terms of an intellectual crisis 
may just be too easy, for genuine intellectual life is by nature a crisis in 
itself, a clash between the world of ideas and the real world, a clash 
between the old and the new. Every generation is involved in such 
crises. But the problems French intellectuals are facing in the 1980s go 
much deeper and much further, they encompass our very model of 
development all over the world, namely modernity. The present-day 
French intellectual crisis accordingly develops at two distinct levels. It 
still concerns French intellectuals and their role in their own society. But 
our French crisis is also, in much broader terms, a crisis about France 
itself and not only its intellectuals, it is an ideological dilemma about the 
validity of our privileged position in the world of today. And at both 
levels, China is still part of our intellectual horizon. 
How should intellectuals stand in relation to politics? Should they 
be involved? The prevailing trend in today's France is almost total 
rejection of the intellectuel engage figure, of the politically committed 
intellectual in the tradition of Voltaire and Hugo, of Emile Zola, Romain 
Rolland and Jean-Paul Sartre. Here China has . certainly played an 
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indirect yet influential role; for the simplistic excesses of the pro-Maoist 
rhetoric of yesterday and the bitter, almost overnight realisation that the 
Maoist mirage was just a mirage, greatly contributed to the discredit of 
the intellectuel engage. Ironically enough, the same ex-radicals who are 
presently disavowing their Maoist past have not altogether given up their 
incorrigible tendency to look abroad for an ideal society. The New 
Philosophers have turned far away from China to a completely new 
direction, namely the United States and Reaganism. This is the New 
Libertarian Right, campaigning in France for economic deregulation and 
military solidarity with Washington. 
Another critical question for present-day French intellectuals deals 
with their own position in society at large. With the present-day 
tendency towards elitist professionalisation of academics, doctors, 
architects and engineers, the 'barefoot doctor' of the Maoist era appears 
more and more remote. But did the barefoot doctor just represent a 
Utopian dream, a Rousseauistic image? Interestingly enough, in many 
developing countries of Asia and Africa, people who probably never 
read a line of Mao Zedong in their lives commonly refer to 'barefoot 
architects', more familiar with local building materials than with 
reinforced concrete, and more concerned with the needs of the ordinary 
people than with the tastes of high-ranking business executives in their 
luxury hotels. 
More generally, the relevance of the Western model of 
development for most African, Asian, South American and also Pacific 
countries is vigorously debated today among French and other Western 
intellectuals, and this brings us back to China. How to balance heavily 
centralised technologies, 'white elephants' such as giant dams, 
expressways, large-scale forestry felling, with 'appropriate technologies' 
better adjusted to the natural and social environment? How to check the 
power and influence of foreign technicians indifferent to local problems? 
How to control the abysmal growth of destitute shanty towns? These 
basic problems of China have become the problems of Amazonia, South 
Asia, Black Africa, Melanesia. The interests of some Parisian 
intellectuals may have shifted elsewhere, but other intellectuals have 
remained deeply concerned with the relevance, or the irrelevance, of our 
Western model of development for less affluent countries. In a recent 
17 
book dealing with the problems of development,19 Edgard Pisani, a 
French intellectual who is also a former French High Commissioner in 
New Caledonia, has compared the energy gains offered by a large-scale 
modem dam with the energy savings of 5,000 peasant earthenware 
stoves. His point is this: these 5,000 stoves are very cheaply produced 
and they save the heat otherwise wasted when the kettle was just put on 
stones; these stoves compare very favourably in terms of energy gains 
with the expensive dam built by transnational corporations under the 
supervision of highly-paid foreign experts. Pisani is a moderate social 
democrat. He never indulged in radical Maoism. Yet his argument 
clearly amounts to a posthumous and quite unexpected validation of 
some basic themes of the Great Leap Forward thirty years ago. 
From Watteau paintings and the Pompadour festivities to peasant 
stoves in Black Africa, from the Confucian mirage of the eighteenth 
century to the Maoist mirage of the twentieth century, from Victor 
Hugo's maledictions against Anglo-French vandalism in Peking to the 
Gaullian joint celebration of France de toujours and Chine de toujours, 
from the Philosophes' appeal to China against the tyranny of the old 
monarchy to the New Radicals' appeal to China against the tyranny of 
the Western model of development, the story of Sino-French intellectual 
relations for the last three centuries has been extraordinarily rich and 
diversified. 
From this kaleidoscopic sequence, possibly the most sensitive, the 
most radical and the most disruptive image is that of Baudelaire: 
Just as in the old days we would leave for China 
Our eyes looking out to sea and our hair streaming in the wind 
We shall sail henceforth for the Sea of Darkness 
Cheerful and lighthearted as a young traveller. 
We were departing for China with our hair streaming in the wind, and 
here is the Sea of Darkness. The worldwide ecological environment is in 
mortal danger in soil and sea, forests and atmosphere. The Third World 
is facing insoluble indebtedness, suburban youth is threatened with mass 
dereliction, our uncontrolled agricultural surpluses are unable to cope 
19 Edgard Pisani, La Main et l' entil (Paris, 1985). 
18 
with hundreds of millions of famine-stricken people. Such is the Sea of 
Darkness before us. Some people, in Baudelaire's own words, may 
nevertheless be sailing for Darkness and Chaos with the light heart of a 
young traveller, fascinated by the achievements of computers, space 
technologies, high-tech communications and the like. I have met such 
people and they do exist, in China itself as well as in the West. But 
others are more careful, more demanding, more realistic in the long run, 
and not only among French intellectuals. 
Long ago, the French Catholic radical thinker Pascal was, just like 
so many of us, fascinated by the unique position of China in world 
history. He wrote in his sundry notes, his Pensees: 
Histoire de Chine ... 11 y a de quoi aveugler et de quoi eclaircir . .. 
Mais la Chine obscurcit, dites-vous. Et je reponds: la Chine 
obscurcit mais il y a clarte a trouver. Cherchez-la.20 
There is in China enough to blind us and enough to illuminate us. 
But China makes things obscure, wouldn't you say! And I reply: 
China makes things obscure, but there is light to be found. Seek it 
out. 
Yes, there is light beyond the Sea of Darkness. I thank you. 
20 Blaise Pascal, Pensees, no. 822, Oeuvres completes (Paris, Le 
Seuil, 1963), p. 605. 
THE GEORGE ERNEST MORRISON 
LECTURE IN ETHNOLOGY 
The George Ernest Morrison Lecture was founded by Chinese residents 
in Australia and others in honour of the late Dr G.E. Morrison, a native 
of Geelong, Victoria, Australia. 
The objects of the foundation of the lectureship were to honour for 
all time the memory of a great Australian who rendered valuable 
services to China, and to improve cultural relations between China and 
Australia. The foundation of the lectureship had the official support of 
the Chinese Consulate-General and was due in particular to the efforts of 
Mr William Liu, merchant, of Sydney; Mr William Ah Ket, barrister, of 
Melbourne; Mr FJ. Quinlan and Sir Colin MacKenzie, of Canberra. 
From the time of its inception until 1948 the lecture was associated with 
the Australian Institute of Anatomy, but in the latter year the 
responsibility for the management of the lectureship was taken over by 
the Australian National University, and the lectures delivered since that 
date have been given under the auspices of the University. 
The following lectures have been delivered: 
Inaugural: W.P. Chen, The Objects of the Foundation of the Lectureship 
and a Review of Dr Morrison's Life in China. 10 May 1932. 
Second: W. Ah Ket, Eastern Thought, with More Particular Reference 
to Confucius. 3 May 1933. 
Third: J.S. MacDonald, The History and Development of Chinese Art. 3 
May 1934. 
Fourth: W.P. Chen, The New Culture Movement in China. 10 May 1935. 
Fifth: Wu Lien-teh, Reminiscences of George E. Morrison; and Chinese 
Abroad. 2 September 1936.* 
Sixth: Chun-jien Pai, China Today: With Special Reference to Higher 
Education. 4 May 1937. 
Seventh: A.F. Bark.er, The Impact of Western Industrialism on China. 17 
May 1939. 
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Eighth: S.H. Roberts, The Gifts of the Old China to the New. 5 June 
1939. 
Ninth: Howard Mowll, West China as Seen Through the Eyes of the 
Westerner. 29 May 1949. 
Tenth: W.G. Goddard, The Ming Shen. A Study in Chinese Democracy. 5 
June 1941. 
Eleventh: D.B. Copland, The Chinese Social Structure. 27 September 
1948.* 
Twelfth: J.K. Rideout, Politics in Medieval China. 28 October 1949. 
Thirteenth: C.P. FitzGerald, The Revolutionary Tradition in China. 19 
March 1951. 
Fourteenth: H.V. Evatt, Some Aspects of Morrison's Life and Work. 4 
December 1952. 
Fifteenth: Lord Lindsay of Birker, China and the West. 20 October 
1953. 
Sixteenth: M. Titiev, Chinese Elements in Japanese Culture. 27 July 
1954. 
Seventeenth: H. Bielenstein, Emperor Kuang-Wu (AD. 25-27) and the 
Northern Barbarians. 2 November 1955.* 
Eighteenth: Leonard B. Cox, The Buddhist Temples of Yun-Kang and 
Lung-Men. 17October1956.* 
Nineteenth: Otto P.N. Berkelbach van der Sprenkel, The Chinese Civil 
Service. 4 November 1957. 
Twentieth: A.R. Davies, The Narrow Lane: Some Observations on the 
Recluse in Traditional Chinese Society. 19 November 1958. 
Twenty-first: C.N. Spinks, The Khmer Temple of Prah Vihar. 6 October 
1959.* 
Twenty-second: Chen Chih-mai, Chinese Landscape Painting: The 
Golden Age. 5 October 1960.* 
Twenty-third: L. Carrington Goodrich, China's Contacts with Other 
Parts of Asia in Ancient Times. 1August1961.* 
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Twenty-fourth: N.G.D. Malmqvist, Problems and Methods in Chinese 
Linguistics. 22 November 1962.* 
Twenty-fifth: H.F. Simon, Some Motivations of Chinese Foreign Policy. 
3 October 1963. 
Twenty-sixth: Wang Ling, Calendar, Cannon and Clock in the Cultural 
Relations between Europe and China. 18 November 1964. 
Twenty-seventh: A.M. Halpern, Chinese Foreign Policy - Success or 
Failure? 9 August 1966.* 
Twenty-eighth: J.W. de Jong, Buddha's Word in China. 18 October 
1967.* 
Twenty-ninth: J.D. Frodsham, New Perspectives in Chinese Literature. 
23 July 1968.* 
Thirtieth: E.A. Huck, The Assimilation of the Chinese in Australia. 6 
November 1969.* 
Thirty-first K.A. Wittfogel, Agriculture: A Key to the Understanding of 
Chinese Society, Past and Present. 6 April 1970.* 
Thirty-second: I. de Rachewiltz, Prester John and Europe's Discovery 
of East Asia. 3 November 1971.* 
Thirty-third: Eugene Kamenka, Marx, Marxism and China. 6 September 
1972. 
Thirty-fourth: Liu Ts'un-yan, On the Art of Ruling a Big Country: Views 
of Three Chinese Emperors. 13 November 1973.* 
Thirty-fifth: Jerome Ch'en, Peasant Activism in Contemporary China. 
22 July 1974. 
Thirty-sixth: Yi-fu Tuan, Chinese Attitudes to Nature: Idea and Reality. 
3 September 1975. 
Thirty-seventh: Lo Hui-Min, The Tradition and Prototypes of the China-
Watcher. 27 October 1976.* 
Thirty-eighth: Roy Hofheinz, People, Places and Politics in Modern 
China. 17 August 1977. 
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Thirty-ninth: Mark Elvin, Self-Liberation and Self-Immolation in 
Modern Chinese Thought. 13 September 1978.* 
Fortieth: Wang Gungwu, Power, Rights and Duties in Chinese History. 
19 September 1979.* 
Forty-first Dr Fang Chao-ying, The Great Wall of China: Keeping Out 
or Keeping In? 5 June 1980. 
Forty-second: Tien Ju-K'ang, Moslem Rebellion in China: A Yunnan 
Controversy. 17June1981.* 
Forty-third: Alan Thorne, China and Australia: Forty Thousand Years of 
Contact. 4 August 1982. 
Forty-fourth: Chan Hok-lam, Control of Publishing in China, Past and 
Present. 24 August 1983.* 
Forty-fifth: J.S. Gregory, The Chinese and Their Revolutions. 8 August 
1984.* 
Forty-sixth: Allen S. Whiting, China and the World: Independence v 
Dependence. 31July1985.* 
Forty-seventh: Pierre Ryckmans, The Chinese Attitude Towards the 
Past. 16July 1986.* 
Forty-eighth: Jean Chesneaux, China in the Eyes of the French 
Intellectuals. 24 June 1987.* 
* Available from Contemporary China Centre, Research School of 
Pacific Studies. 

